Science has not provided good enough answers to the question of the origin of the pandemic

The origin of the corona pandemic has become a polarizing question. Jörn Klein and Rein Aasland write in Aftenposten on August 29 that the scientific evidence points to the pandemic being originated by zoonosisThat is, infection from animals.

This is a reasonable and expected conclusion based on the published science. However, the validity of the conclusion presupposes that the research is in line with basic scientific method with openness about what one does not know, and active search for facts that can disprove one's own hypothesis. That's not the case in this case.

The early and influential research on the origin of the pandemic is characterized by the fact that the researchers intended to show why the virus must have been infected by zoonosis and not from a laboratory, rather than objectively assessing all possibilities.

Here politics has become entwined with what should have been open and free research.

In February/March 2020, some of the world's most important scientific journals concluded that “no types of laboratory-based scenarios are plausible” (Naturemedicina), that “there are rumors and conspiracy theories that the virus may have come from a laboratory” (Emerging Microbes and Infections) and “we stand together to strongly condemn conspiracy theories that suggest that covid-19 does not have a natural origin” (The Lancet).

Here, then, a scientific consensus is established that a laboratory origin is not plausible and that the hypothesis is a conspiracy theory.

We could have described a number of our professional objections to these articles, such as that the “genetic design” on the furin-site of the virus does not preclude that it may have been subject to genetic modification. But we rather devote our space to other matters of greater importance to our views.

The private communication between the authors of the former article in Nature Medicine, obtained through legal processes in the United States, namely, shows that the researchers did not stand behind their own conclusions.

They write, for example, that “the genetics of the virus is not consistent with what one would expect from natural evolution”, “it is so incredibly likely that the virus could have escaped from a lab”, and “I hate when politics gets mixed into science, but it is impossible not to do so given the circumstances”.

Even after the first version of the article is published, they write privately that “I literally fluctuate from day to day between lab accidents and natural origins” and “unfortunately we cannot rule out contagion accidents from the laboratory.”

A month after publication, they write: “The Furin seat may have been inserted using genetic engineering, nor is it particularly difficult.” We can sign on to that, based on our own lab experiences.

The private communications clearly show that the authors were under pressure from people with conflicts of interest in the matter.

A similar backdrop has the second article in Emerging Microbes and Infections. While they are doing final proofs on the text, write the authors privately that they “cannot imagine how the furin seat has accreted naturally, and that it is frightening to think that it might be genetically modified”.

Even more problematic is that the journal editor allows scholars with major conflicts of interest to influence the text without being named. One example is Zhengli Shi of the Wuhan Institute of Virology, who is in charge of the laboratory where a possible lab leak has come from (page 262).

On top of it all, the editor dropped peer review (page 188) and accepted the article same day as it was submitted, contrary to scientific standards.

Scientist Peter Daszak took Initiated and led to the third article in The Lancet in pen. He has significant conflicts of interest in the case. He and his organization EcoHealth Alliance have been collaborating with the institute in Wuhan on research on genetically modified coronaviruses for many years.

Daszak is now banned from public funding by US health authorities after misleading the authorities about this research.

Under oath, several of the authors of the article have clarified that they did not mean to rule out laboratory accidents as such, only obvious conspiracy theories that the virus may have been a biological weapon, or that it has got inserted DNA from snakes or HIV viruses.

But that's not what the articles say, and they practically buried the whole lab leak discussion for over a year.

The two the articles in Science that later identified the wet market in Wuhan as the epicenter of the contagion, is written by several of the same authors as mentioned above. Here, too, the authors add up to the conclusion without really considering other plausible explanations and uncertainties in the method, such as that the data base was skewed because there was a requirement for a link to the market or a nearby hospital to be recorded as infected during the relevant period.

We are critical that these two articles were sold in to the media as “definitive proof” for the wet market being the origin of the pandemic before they were peer reviewed and such excessive wording was removed.

The World Health Organization points out in a recent statement that “we still do not know how the pandemic started, and the work to understand its origin is unfinished”.

Many other factors contribute to us considering a lab leak as plausible and more likely than what the scientific publications give the impression.

Key U.S. intelligence agencies, including the FBI, believe that a lab leak is more likely than natural origin. In short, it is not possible to conclude without further investigation.

Maybe we'll never get a sure answer. But for research to help find them, it must adhere to common standards of objectivity and transparency. It will also give us as a scientific community vital confidence when actual conspiracy theories are to be addressed.

And more importantly: In the future, there will be new viruses that can become pandemics. When that happens, we must have good conditions for information sharing and free research in a global cooperation on infection control, rapid vaccine development and distribution, and other measures to protect the population. Regardless of whether the infection comes from nature or a laboratory.